Comment This isn't the network we tried to build (Score 5, Insightful) 61
			
		 	
				We tried to build a resilient network of interoperating but not interdependent systems.  Each time we had to make a design and implementation compromise -- for example, DNS -- we argued at length about its merits: was the convenience or the performance or the abstraction worth the price in reliability or security or simplicity?  Those debates are long-forgotten by now, of course, but we did have them and we tried to engineer the best possible decisions we could.
 
That was then. This is now. Back then, we thought about the long-term good of the network and its prospects for helping human society. Today everyone is thinking about next quarter's profits and nobody cares about the impact on people. And thus the original architecture of the network has been subsumed by a relatively small number of operations which in turn are in the critical path for hundreds of thousands of operations. The network is now -- ironically -- far more fragile than it was when we cobbled together connections between the ARPAnet, Usenet, CSNet, and BITnet with spare parts.
 
It's now entirely plausible that an adversary with a budget of under $1M US could cripple the country for days to weeks, disrupting air travel, commerce, utilities, telecommunications, etc. via simultaneous attacks on just a handful of operations. And the budget to do the same to other countries may be considerably smaller.
 
We can't fix this. We're old and dying off, and those few of us who are left are dismissed as out-of-touch and obsolete. It will be up to those of you who are much younger to reverse this by pushing -- hard -- to move things back to as distributed an architecture as possible. Good luck.
		
		
		
	That was then. This is now. Back then, we thought about the long-term good of the network and its prospects for helping human society. Today everyone is thinking about next quarter's profits and nobody cares about the impact on people. And thus the original architecture of the network has been subsumed by a relatively small number of operations which in turn are in the critical path for hundreds of thousands of operations. The network is now -- ironically -- far more fragile than it was when we cobbled together connections between the ARPAnet, Usenet, CSNet, and BITnet with spare parts.
It's now entirely plausible that an adversary with a budget of under $1M US could cripple the country for days to weeks, disrupting air travel, commerce, utilities, telecommunications, etc. via simultaneous attacks on just a handful of operations. And the budget to do the same to other countries may be considerably smaller.
We can't fix this. We're old and dying off, and those few of us who are left are dismissed as out-of-touch and obsolete. It will be up to those of you who are much younger to reverse this by pushing -- hard -- to move things back to as distributed an architecture as possible. Good luck.